



Over the last five years, Japan has succeeded
in reducing her inflation rate to a degree that,
from an American perspective, can only seem
enviable. In 1974, Japanese consumer prices
rose by nearly 25 percent. By 1978, CPI infla-
tion had declined to 3 percent, and, despite
sharp oil price increases, remained below 5
percent for 1979 as a whole. Japan's success in
reducing inflation is all the more remarkable in
view of its experience with two factors widely
blamed for U.S. inflation: oil price increases
and government budget deficits. Japan is sub-
stantially more dependent upon foreign oil
than is the U.S., and so should have suffered
more inflation from OPEC price increases.
Moreover, Japan's budget deficit as a fraction
ofits GNP has been nearly twice the U.S. ratio
since 1976.
Japan's real growth and unemployment per-
formance over the last five years has been far
less enviable than her inflation experience. Be-
tween 1965 and 1972, Japan's real GNP grew
at a lOYz-percent annual rate. After 1975, real
growth averaged less than 6 percent, and in no
year has it substantially exceeded that figure.
Japan's unemployment rate-always remark-
ably low compared to other industrial coun-
tries-rose to nearly twice the 1965-72 average
in the second half of the 1970's.
This paper reviews Japan's experience in re-
ducing inflation, and examines several issues
raised by it that are potentially applicable to
other countries. Section I considers the factors
accounting for the rise and fall of Japanese
inflation overthe 1973-78period. We found that
the 1973-74 surge in import prices, and in par-
ticular the 1974 oil price hike, was a major but
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not the most important factor behind the up-
surge in inflation. Instead, variations in Japan's
money growth were the single most important
factor in the 1973-74 rise in inflation, and in its
subsequent abatement over the next four
years.
Japan's experience is perhaps most interest-
ing for what it reveals about the costs of re-
ducing inflation. According to a common view,
lowering inflation necessarily entails a very sub-
stantial and prolonged cost in terms of reduced
real growth and higher unemployment. Ja-
pan's performance would at first seem to con-
firm that this cost is indeed very high and pro-
tracted, judging from both the severity of the
1974 recession and the exceptionally sluggish
recovery that followed. The evidence cited in
Section II suggests that Japan's attempts to
reduceinflation through reduced money growth
substantially aggravated the 1974 recession.
However, it also suggests that the continuation
of slow money growth may not have been pri-
marily responsible for the sluggishness of the
recovery. Instead, real growth may have
lagged largely because of the undermining of
investorconfidence by thepreviousinflation and
the ensuing recession. If this is so, the cost of
reducing Japan's inflation, while high, was not
as great as simple comparisons of its actual
and pre-1973 performances might suggest.
Taken as a whole, Japan's experience thus
suggests two lessons relevant for the U.S. and
other industrial countries. First, lowering
money growth can bring inflation down within
several years' time. Second, other factors be-
sides reduced money growth may produce pe-
riods of reduced real GNP growth, such as
Japan experienced after 1973; the cost, that is,
of reducing inflation in Japan was high, but notso high as might appear at first. Other aspects
of Japan's experience noted below-such as
her ability to reduce money growth in the face
ofvery large government budget deficits-may
also have wider significance. Further analysis
of Japan's experience thus may define addi-
tional lessons of use to other industrial econ-
omies.
I. Rise and Fall of Inflation
Economists generally agree that variations
in average long-run inflation are nearly always
caused by changes in domestic money growth.
There are disagreements, however, about the
impact of money growth on medium-term fluc-
tuations in inflation, over periods of several
years or so. According to one view, other fac-
tors-such as government budget deficits or
imported-goods price changes-cannot have
more than a small and temporary effect upon
the level of domestic prices unless they are
'accommodated' by changes in the domestic
money stock.....J\.ccording to an alternative vie\v,
such 'non-monetary' factors can independently
and significantly affect inflation for a consider-
able time-although, because they tend to be
sporadic and reversible, their influence dimin-
ishes with the lengthening of the time horizon.
The first view implies that a policy of steady
money growth will alleviate all but relatively
smallfluctuationsininflation;thesecondsuggests
that substantial variability in inflation may re-
main even after money growth is stabilized.
During the last seven years, prices in Japan
(as in other countries) have been buffeted to
an unusual degree by external shocks largely
unrelated to her domestic money growth.
These included the commodity-price increases
of 1973-74, as well as the sharp exchange-rate
fluctuations (appreciation and then deprecia-
tion) of the 1977-79 period. For this reason,
it is worthwhile examining the sources of Jap-
anese inflation to find an indication ofthe extent
to which factors other than domestic money
growthcan affect inflation. As explained below,
money was in fact the main factor accounting
for the rise and fall of Japanese inflation, but
traded goods' prices played a significant role
as well.
Waxing & Waning of Inflation
Beginning in 1973, Japan experienced its
worstinflation since the early1950's, with prices
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rising at double-digit levels in that and the
following year. Over that two-year period, the
GNP price deflator increased by nearly 40 per-
cent, compared with the II-percent increase
experienced over a typical two-year period
during the 1960's. Increases in consumer and
wholesale prices were even more dramatic, re-
flecting sharp increases in the prices ofJapanese
imports relative to non-traded goods and ser-
vices.
Then, following Japan's first decline in real
GNP in nearly twenty years, inflation abated
nearly as fast as it had arisen. By 1975, infla-
tion measuredby the GNPdeflatorwas virtually
back to the 1960's average, although consumer
price inflation remained high by historical stan-
dards through 1976. Inflation decelerated fur-
ther during 1977 and 1978, with wholesale
prices actually falling over that period. Thus
the lessons drawn fromJapan'sinflation perfor-
mance of the 1973-78 period are likely to be
very important for other countries: no other
major industrial country experienced a sharper
surge in inflation during 1973-74, and none was
as successful as Japan in reducing inflation
thereafter. I What then accounted for the rise
and fall of Japan's inflation?
Inflation, both in Japan and elsewhere, is
often attributed to a variety of factors. The
most prominent "candidates" include high
government-expenditure levels and budget
deficits, wage increases in excess of productiv-
ity gains, exchange-rate depreciations and/or
import-price increases, and money-supply
growth. As it happens, the list of factors sub-
stantially affecting Japan's inflation can be eas-
ily narrowed to the latter two.
Neither the government budget deficit nor
accelerating government expenditures can
plausibly be blamed for Japan's 1973-74 infla-
tion surge. During the late 1960's, Japan's
budget deficits were relatively modest, aver-
aging about one percent of her GNP. The def-icits then increased in 1972 and 1973 to about
1V2 percent of GNP, but were still quite com-
parable to those in the U.S., where inflation
was only about half as great as in Japan. Mean-
while, government expenditures as a fraction
of GNP also remained relatively stable during
the early 1970's. Indeed, Japan's budget deficit
and government expenditures did not rise sub-
stantially until after 1975, when inflation was
declining. Japan in 1977 and 1978 managed to
keep inflation at or below the 1960's average,
while incurring a budget deficit whose size (rel-
ative to GNP) was easily the largest of any
major industrial country. Government fiscal
policy, therefore, was probably not a major
factor in Japan's inflation over this period.2
Likewise, it is very doubtful that 'excessive'
wage increases led to the 1973-74 inflation.
Table 1
Basic Data Sheet for Japan
1
1962-70
Average 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
GNP Growth Rate (%)
Nominal GNP 17.2 8.0 17.6 23.2 18.0 8.4 10.9 11.2 9.8 7.0
Real GNP 11.4 4.3 11.9 6.2 -1.5 3.4 5.0 5.8 6.1 6.0
Inflation Rate (%)
Consumer 5.8 5.5 4.6 16.5 24.5 8.5 9.4 6.2 3.1 4.9
Wholesale 1.7 1.0 4.0 24.0 23.3 0.7 6.1 -1.0 3.2 16:0
GNP Deflator 5.2 3.7 5.7 15.5 18.3 5.0 5.9 5.4 3.7 1.0
Wage Rate 12.1 13.9 16.5 19.5 26.1 13.4 11.3 9.3 5.3 6.0
Money Supply Growth (%)
M P 17.1 29.9 25.0 17.1 11.8 11.1 12.5 8.2 13.4 3.0
M-25 17.4 24.4 24.8 16.8 11.5 14.4 13.6 11.1 13.1 8.4
Change in Exchange Rate (%)
Dollar Exchange Rate 0 13.6 4.2 7.8 -7.0 1.4 4.2 22.0 23.3 18.9
Trade-Weighted Rate' na na 11.8 7.6 -6.4 3.2 3.6 10.6 24.2 6.7
Real Exchange Rate6 na 3.7 6.6 10.8 2.3 -12.0 3.8 3.4 11.6 11.6
Government Deficit/GNP (%) 1.3 0.2 1.6 1.6 1.3 4.4 2.0 6.1 6.5 5.3
Foreign Exchange Reserves
($ billion) 1.8 13.8 16.5 10.2 11.3 10.6 13.9 20.1 28.91
Change in Unit Labor Costs (%) 1.7 10.7 2.6 6.0 41.0 9.1 -4.2 4.1 -4.9 3.02
Unemployment Rate (%) 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1
Average Output Gap3(%) 1.2 3.0 5.8 0.1 -8.4 24.5 19.2 -19.9 18.6 15.4
JAil growth rates are computed fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter unless otherwise indicated.
2Figure refers to 1979.3/1978.3.
3The output gap is defined as the percentage difference between actual and potential industrial output. Data are taken
directly from Artus (1978) for 1960-77, and then estimated using his potential-output figures and industrial-production
series from International Financial Statistics for 1978-79.
'The trade-weighted exchange rate is an average of the value of the dollar against foreign currencies taken from
International Financial Statistics; the 'real' exchange rate is a trade-weighted average of the dollar-denominated
wholesale prices of Japan relative to those of her competitors (Source: IFS).
Sfigures are year-end over year-end; for 1979, considerable distortion exists due to year-end window dressing or some
other factor. The average M-l level in December 1979 was about 9 percent higher than the average of December 1978.
6'fhe 'real' exchange rate is a trade-weighted average of the dollar-denominated wholesale prices of Japan relative to
those of her competitors (Source: IFS). The figures in the table are percentage changes in yearly averages. For 1977,
1978, and 1979, the fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter percentage changes are 8.1%, 9.6%, and -22.0% respectively.
26During the 1960's, Japanese wages typically
increased at more than twice the general infla-
tion rate. This pattern reflected rapid advances
in productivity, as the increase in unit labor
costs was very modest. Unit labor costs accel-
erated in 1971 in line with that year's cyclical
downturn, but then decelerated again in 1972.
Thus the 1973-74 surge in prices was not pre-
ceded by wage increases large enough to ac-
count for the ensuing inflation. And the sharp
1973-74 increases in wage rates are, for rea-
sons cited below, most plausibly regarded as
symptomsofinflationarypressuresgeneratedby
other factors.
In fact, only money growth and sharp im-
port-price increases were large enough to have
led to an acceleration in inflation of the mag-
nitude observed. And, aside from money
growth, only the yen's sharp 1977-78 appre-
ciation could have contributed substantially to
the ebbing of inflation after 1974. The question
now is, what was the relative importance of
each of these in Japan's inflation?
Was Inflation Imported?
The obvious interdependence among na-
tional economies revealed by the events of the
1970's has led to increased concern that a
country may 'import' price increases from
abroad to the detriment of its anti-inflationary
policies at home. Much of this concern origi-
nates in the 1973-74 period, when a sharp run-
up in world commodity prices was associated
with aninflationsurge in allindustrial countries,
not simply in Japan. These extraordinary com-
modity price rises accounted for perhaps as
much as half of the acceleration in U.S. infla-
tion in that period.3 Since Japan is even more
dependent than the U.S. upon international
trade, it is reasonable to ask if her 1973-74
inflation was largely imported.
Certainly, the increase in prices of Japan's
traded goods was spectacular. During that two-
year period, the average price of Japan's im-
ports ofgoods and services rose by 87 percent,
while her export prices increased by roughly
45 percent. Exchange-rate movements had
very little influence on these increases, and in-
deed the average foreign currency value of the
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yen did not change appreciably over the period
as a whole. Instead, the general rise in Japan's
traded-goods prices can be traced to conditions
prevailing in world markets--eonditions which
were largely external to Japan's economy.
Probably the most important of these was a
general acceleration in money growth in the
industrial countries, which led to a sharp rise
in world aggregate demand. In addition, sup-
ply shortages, low inventory levels, and other
'special' factors led to severe rises in prices of
key raw materials, the most spectacular of
which was the early-1974 four-fold increase in
the price ofoil.4 These increases accounted for
a nearly 30-percent decline in Japan's terms-
of-trade (the price of her exports relative to
her imports), and represented a substantial
loss of real income to her citizens.
There was, however, another potential cause
of the price upsurge-the 1971-72 acceleration
in money growth. Over that two-year period
as a whole, M-1 rose by 62 percent and M-2
by 55 percent. (M-1 includes currency plus
commercial-bank demand deposits, and M-2
includes the same plus time deposits.) These
increases were at least half again as large as
the average increases of the 1960's. Most of
the acceleration stemmed from Japan's mas-
sive purchases of dollars, undertaken in an
effort to stabilize the foreign-exchange value
of the yen, which accompanied the December
1971 devaluation of the dollar. These pur-
chases swelled domestic bank reserves, allow-
ing the subsequent sharp increase in bank de-
posits. Despite this, the increase in money
growth cannot meaningfully be termed 'im-
ported.' After 1971, Japan was subject to no
international obligation to maintain the pre-
1971 foreign-exchange value of the yen. More-
over, this rise in money growth in response to
dollar purchases can be traced largely to a
deliberate policy choice of the authorities; six
years later, equally massive purchases of dol-
lars did not lead to any significant acceleration
in money growth.s
Despite the unusually rapid growth in
money during 1971 and 1972, Japan's prices
did not begin to accelerate until 1973. This
delay in money's impact is not unusual; be-cause of contracts and other impediments to
commodity-price changes, the effects of
money-growth variations usually take at least
a year to become manifest, and often consid-
erably longer. In addition, the impact upon
inflation could have been even further delayed
because the surge in money growth was unu-
sually severe and prolonged.6
Which factor, then, money growth or in-
creases in traded-goods prices, was mainly re-
sponsible for Japan's 1973-74 inflation? A re-
cent study by Spitaeller (1978) suggests that
the extra inflation was attributable principally
to the increase in import prices. He found that
Japan's wholesale-price index tended to rise
by nearly 30 percent of any increase in import
prices. This would suggest roughly a 30-per-
cent rise in 1973-74, resulting from the dou-
bling of import prices-or almost two-thirds of
the actual increase in wholesale price inflation
over that period. However, this and similar
findings reveal primarily the association be-
tween import- and domestic-price increases
over the estimation period, and thus reflect in
part the monetary policies followed by the au-
thorities. For this reason, such estimates can
provide a very misleading indication of the
independent contribution of traded-goods
prices to domestic inflation-that is, of their
impact with a given path of domestic money.7
In fact, a simple calculation-which effec-
tively treats the terms-of-trade deterioration as
a tax-shows that traded goods' price hikes at
most could have had only a quite modest im-
pact on the price level in the long-run. This
approach involves calculating the extra amount
Japan's residents paid to foreigners, versus the
additional amount received, as a result of the
1973-74 increases in traded-goods prices. Spe-
cifically, Japan's imports in 1972 amounted to
10 percent of her GNP, so that the 88-percent
increase in import prices over the following
two years required an additional payment for
the same volume equal to 8.8 percent of annual
GNP; likewise, the increase in export prices
transferred additional income to Japan equal
to 4.5 percent of annual GNP (10 percent of
the 45-percent increase). The total effect upon
income available to residents was the differ-
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ence between the additional payments and re-
ceipts, or about 4 percent of GNP. This pro-
vides a rough estimate of the reduction in
Japan's purchasing power that resulted from
the external price increases.
Assuming proportionality between real
money demand and real income (as was gen-
erally the case prior to 1973), Japan experi-
enced about a 4-percent reduction in the de-
mand for money. This reduction, given the
level of the money stock, would have required
a 4-percent increase in Japan's price level to
bring real money demand and supply into bal-
ance.8 An ultimate price effect of this magni-
tude is clearly significant, but it plainly is very
modest compared to the actual acceleration in
inflation observedduring 1973 and 1974. Incon-
trast, since an increase in money tends to lead
eventually to a proportionate rise in domestic
prices, the 1971-72 money growth had a much
larger ultimate impact upon prices.
Normally, however, the long-run impact of
external price increases, which may take sev-
eral years to be completed, will be smaller
than the short-run effects. A rise in import
prices raises the domestic price level directly
and fairly immediately. The resulting fall in
real money balances (given an unchanged path
for the nominal money stock) later depresses
the prices of other domestic goods, although
this process can be quite protracted. Hence
the impact of external price increases upon the
1973-74 inflation could have been substantially
greater than the above calculation would sug-
gest. For this reason, it may be useful to com-
pare the price effects of two alternative
money-growth scenarios-one assuming the
historical growth rate, and the other assuming
the actual 1971-72 growth path of the money
stock. (In each case, we assume that the ex-
ternal price increases of 1973-74 had not oc-
curred.) The difference implied by these two
hypothetical scenarios provides a crude but
nonetheless revealing indication of the extent
to which the 1971-72 acceleration in money
growth contributed to the 1973-74 inflation.
To begin, assume that both real income and
the M-2 money stock had grown at their his-
torical averages during the 1971-72 period-that is, 38 percent for M-2 and about 24 per-
cent for real GNP (and thus real money de-
mand). This growth ofnominal money relative
to real money demand would, in turn, have
resulted ultimately in an ll-percent increase in
the GNPdeflator (Table 2). On the otherhand,
Me2 actually grew by 55 percent, which would
suggest a 25-percent increase in the deflator
given the same growth in real GNP. In either
case, virtually ail ofthe price increase resulting
from the 1971-72 money growth probably
would have occurred in 1973-74 because, as
indicated earlier, virtually no effect of the ear-
lier money expansion was in fact evident until
1973. (For the same reason, the 1973-74
money and output growth is ignored for this
calculation.) Thus, this reasoning suggests, in-
flation during 1973-74 would have been nearly
14 percentage points higher than the historical
rate as a result of the 1971-72 acceleration in
money growth alone. This accounts for more
than half of the actual 1973-74 acceleration in
the deflator. And this estimate may be conser-
vative, because when M-l is used for the cal-
culation, two-thirds of the additional inflation
appears attributable to money.
It would also be misleading to attribute all
theremaining inflation notaccounted for by this
calculation to the 1973-74 external price in-
creases. The reason is that real output, and
thus real money demand, grew by six percent-
age points less than the historical average over
the 1971-72 period. This reduction in real
money demand could have added a further six
percentage points to the deflatoroverthe 1973-
74 period.9
On balance, then, the 1971-72 acceleration
in money growth probably accounted for more
thanhalfthesurge inJapan'sGNPdeflatorover
the subsequent two years, and possibly for as
much as two-thirds. This would certainly be
true if we include the effect of 1971's slower
real growth, which may itself have resulted
from the 1969-70 mild reduction in money
growth. Japan, that is, would have had double-
digit inflation in 1973-74 even without the in-
crease in external prices. However, variations
in money growth probably had considerably
less impact on consumer and wholesale prices
than they did on the deflator, because traded-
goods prices have substantially more weight in
those two indices than in the deflator. 1O
Our analysis thus shows that the 1973-74
increase in traded-goods prices accounted for
less than half, and quite possibly no more than
one-third, of Japan's inflation increase. This
conclusion is fairly consistent with the experi-
ence of other industrial countries. For exam-
ple, a study for the Joint Economic Committee
of the U.S. Congress (1975) estimated that
import-price increases raised U.S. consumer
prices about 5 percent annually between the
Table 2
Contribution of Money Growth to 1973-1974 Inflation1
Total Money Growth, 1971-1972 (%)
Less: Secular Real Output Growth during 1971-1972 (%)
Equals:3 Predicted rise in GNP Deflator, 1973-1974 (%)
Less: Secular Inflation implied by historical average Money Growth (%)
Equals: Additional Inflation due to higher 1971-1972 Money Growth (%)
Plus: Additional Inflati0n from lower Real Output Growth in 197]2










MEMO: Actual total rise in GNP deflator in 1973-74: 37 percent (26 percent above the secular rate).
lBased on the assumption that priee increases resulting from the growth of nominal money relative to demand (excess
money) in 1971-72 occurred in 1973-74, whereas the impact of excess money growth in 1973-74 was evident after 1974.
2Real output growth over 1971-72 totaled 18 percent, and thus real money demand at the end of 1972 was roughly six
pereent below the level implied by the historical trend.
3Figures are not precisely equal to the arithmetic difference between money and real output growth because ofcompounding.
4This is the figure implied by the historical pattern for M-2 and inflation; for M-I, the implied secular inflation rate is 10
percent.
29end of1972 and mid-1974- about one-quarter
ofthe actual increase. The effect upon Japan's
CPI might be expected to be substantially
greater__Japan's ratio of imports to GNP was
about 40 percent higher than the U.S. ratio in
1972, and her relative dependence upon oil
imports was even greater. However, the esti-
mate given earlier does not seem substantially
out-of-line with that suggested by America's
experience.II It is also worth noting that no
othermajorindustrial country (except Italy)
experienced nearly as sharp an increase in
money growth during this period, and none
experienced nearly as sharp an acceleration in
inflation. 12
Waning of Inflation, 1973-78
The fall in Japanese inflation from 1975 to
1978 was nearly as spectacular as the previous
increase. The CPI began to decelerate steadily
during the last half of 1974, and by 1975 infla-
tion was back to single-digit levels. By 1975,
both the GNP deflator and wage rates were
increasing at or even below the average pace
of the 1960's, although comparable decelera-
tion was not evident in the CPI until 1977. 13
Inflation fell still further in 1978, to well below
the historical rate. In no other major industrial
country, except possibly Germany, was the re-
duction in inflation so substantial and steady.
As the previous discussion suggests, Japan's
money growth was the key to her success in
lowering inflation. Money growth begant9 fall
sharply in 1973 (Chart 1), and continued to
decelerate in 1974. Thus the delay betweentl1e
deceleration of money and the decline in infla-
tion (roughly two years) was consistent with
the lag observed during the previous upsurge.
This again demonstrates that money growth
takes a considerable time to affect domestic
prices. After 1974, both M-l and M-2 grew at
average rates of 12-13 percent annually, nearly
one-third less than during the 1960's. While
the abatement of import price increases after
Chart 1

















30mid-1974 almost surely speeded the initial de-
cline in inflation, the later continuation of that
trend may plausibly be attributed to the re-
duction in money growth.
The other factor often credited with helping
to reduce Japan's inflation in 1977 and 1978---
the nearly 40-percent appreciation in the av-
erage foreign-currency value of the yen-was
itself probably a result rather than a cause of
Japan's lowered money growth. The yen's ap-
preciation far outstripped the contempora-
neous gap between Japanese and foreign infla-
tion, so much so that Japan's wholesale-price
level, in dollar terms, rose almost 20 percent
more than her trading partners' average price
level during this period. This increase in the
real value of the yen led many observers to
conclude that Japan's 1976-78 current-account
surpluses were causing the currency apprecia-
tion, and depressingJapan's inflation rate in the
process. However, as Keran (1979) has argued,
most of Japan's surplus was the result of her
incomplete recovery from the 1974 recession.
Normally, business cycle variations in trade
balances do not have such substantial effects
upon exchange rates. 14
Also, as Keran has shown, the yen's 1977-
78 appreciation may plausibly be attributed to
the differential growth of Japan's money sup-
ply relative to other nations. In 1973, money
growth slowed in Japan, but so did that of
most other industrial countries. By late 1976,
however, Japan's money (adjusted for de-
mand) was growing substantially more slowly
than abroad-especially in comparison with
the U.S. acceleration-and the yen's appreci-
ation followed soon after. The yen's ability to
far out-strip contemporary inflation trends can
be explained by the tendency of exchange rates
to respond more quickly than prices to money
changes, because exchange-rate adjustments
(unlike price adjustments) are not constrained
by contracts and other institutional impedi-
ments. Thus there is a 'monetary' explanation
of the rise in the real, as well as the nominal,
value of the yen. 1S
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Deficits, Intervention, and Money Slowdown
Japan's reduction in money growth was par-
ticularly remarkable in view oftwo factors that
have often considerably complicated money-
supply control-government budget deficits
and foreign-exchange market intervention. No
other major industrial country ran budget def-
icits as large in relation to GNP as Japan did
during this period; none engaged in heavier
foreign-exchange market intervention. Yet
these factors, which are often asserted to make
money-supply control virtually impossible, did
not prevent money growth from remaining rel-
atively low during this period.
The sharp expansion of Japan's budget def-
icit, beginning in 1975, resulted primarily from
an expansion of public-works expenditures
aimed largely at stimulating the private econ-
omy. In effect, the Japanese authorities de-
cided to maintain money growth at a level
thought to be compatible with reducing infla-
tion, while using fiscal policy to stimulate the
economy. By 1978, this endeavor had brought
the government budget deficit to over six per-
cent of GNP-well above the rate in any other
major industrial nation. Indeed, in that year,
government borrowings amounted to nearly
one-third of total expenditures. According to
a widely held view, substantial deficits make it
nearly impossible for the authorities to avoid
excessive money expansion. In this view, con-
tainment of money growth in the face of ex-
panding deficits tends to "squeeze out" smaller
borrowers in politically powerful sectors, such
as agriculture and housing. However, Japan's
experience demonstrates clearly that there is
no inexorable link between expanding budget
deficits and money growth.
Similarly, Japan showed during 1977 and
1978 that heavy foreign-exchange market in-
tervention can be sterilized-that it need not
necessarily lead to an acceleration in money
growth. In that period, Japan's foreign-ex-
change reserves more than doubled, from less
than $14 billion to nearly $29 billion. (That
increase was nearly as great as the 1971-72
rise.) These purchases of dollars resulted from
the authorities' efforts to slow the sharp ap-preciation of the yen. But during 1977 and
1978-and in sharp contrast to 1971-72-Ja-
pan's authorities largely offset the increase in
bank reserves resulting from their foreign-ex-
change intervention by reducing Bank ofJapan
lending to the banking sector. As a result, av-
erage money growth was no higher during
1977-78 than during the previous two years. 16
Severe Downturn, Anemic Recovery
As with the inflation surge, Japan's worst
post-war recession began before the oil crisis
of late 1973. Real growth slowed markedly in
II. Cost of Reducing Japan's Inflation
Japan's success in reducing inflation was ac- the second and third quarters of 1973, follow-
companied by a reduction in real growth and ing the deceleration of money growth by
a rise in unemployment. The 1974--75 reces- roughly one-quarter. Indeed, had real growth
sion was easily Japan's most severe ofthe post- recovered after the fourth quarter, Japan
war era, with real GNP falling for the first time would have recorded a "growth recession"
in over twenty years. Moreover, the subse- comparable in both magnitude and timing with
quent recovery was exceptionally sluggish by those experienced earlier. It seems clear that
Japanese standards, so much so that unem- the oil embargo and subsequent oil-price hikes
ployment and underutilized capacity still re- were mainly responsible for transforming a
main historically high. fairly ordinary downturn into the debacle of
According to a widely held view, Japan's 1974. 18 Output declined nearly 2'12 percent be-
reduced real growth over the 1974--79 period tween the fourth quarter of 1973 and the reces-
was the natural consequence of her policies to sion trough in the first quarter of 1975-an
reduce inflation. In this view, a substantial low- impressive decline for a nation whose average
eringofinflation necessarilyentailsreducedreal annual real growth had previously exceeded 10
growth and increased unemployment for sev- percent.
eral, possibly many, years. 17 This interpreta- The sluggish recovery following the reces-
tion of Japan's experience is not likely to be sion trough was as troubling as the downturn
encouraging to U.S. policymakers, because it itself, and rather less understandable (Chart
suggests that only by tolerating high inflation 2). Real output growth rebounded sharply in
was it possible to substantially reduce unem- the last three quarters of 1975, but unlike pre-
ployment here after 1974--and that bringing vious recoveries, it remained below the secular
inflation back down is a very painful and pro- average. The recovery then effectively petered
tracted task. out, with growth falling back somewhat in 1976
An alternative view of Japan's experience, and settling at slightly below a six-percent an-
however, implies that its sluggish growth after nual rate over the next two years. By the end
the recession was more the consequence of the of 1978, Japan's unemployment rate was ac-
1973-74surgein inflation andoil-price increase, tually higher than at the recession trough.
than of subsequent anti-inflationary policies. Also, the gap between actual and potential
This view attributes the continued sluggishness industrial output, while narrowing, remained
primarily to the depressing effect on spending, near 15 percent. Even this narrowing cannot
particularly private investment, of the uncer- have comforted the authorities, as it reflected
tainty engendered by the previous inflation and mainly a decline in capacity growth resulting
"oil-shock." This suggests that real growth from the depressed state of investment. 19
would have remained slow after 1974 even if Historically, Japan's real growth has been
the government had not continued to restrain led by her private-investment sector, and this
money growth. sector played an equally prominent role in the
sluggish recovery after the 1973-75 recession.
In fact, private investment was largely mori-
bund after the recession, with no real signs of
recovery evident until 1978. Indeed, private
non-residential investment did not attain the
32real level of 1973 until the end of 1978, while
residential investment in the latter year re-
mained below the 1973 peak. It is hard to resist
the conclusion that private investment substan-
tially retarded the recovery in Japan2°-and
perhaps in other industrial nations.
The unusually severe recession, combined
with the increase in oil costs, depressed cor-
porate profits to an unprecedented degree, dis-
couraging investment expenditures that in any
case were made less pressing by the extraor-
dinarily high levels of excess capacity. Perhaps
even more important were the uncertainties
about the future engendered by the previous
inflation and oil-price increases, events which
seemed to many to mark a "watershed" in
Japan's economic "miracle." The violent fluc-
tuations of money growth and inflation in the
1971-75 period were a marked departure from
the 1950's and 1960's, \vhen variations in infla-
tion were fairly modest and fluctuations in
money growth were comparably predictable
and understandable. Consequently, substantial
uncertainty about future government policies
andinflationprobablycouldhave beenexpected
to prevail for some time.
The increase in the price of oil also tended
to discourage investment. First, because capi-
tal goods are generally complementary to en-
ergy inputs in the short-run, the return to in-
vestment in the near-term may have been
reduced by the oil-price increase. Moreover,
uncertainty about the future price of oil (and
security of supply) created doubts about the
payoff to investment in particular productive
techniques, because ofthe possibility that they
might later be rendered obsolete. In any case,
signs of the discouraging investment climate
were evident from a high rate of corporate
bankruptcies and a high level of pessimism
recorded in business surveys.21 Indeed, the
poor investment climate was substantially re-
sponsible for the view, then widely held in
Japan, that real growth in the medium-term
was likely to be well below the pre-1974 av-
erage, in fact probably no higher than six per-
cent.22
These factors would suggest a longer-than-
usual recovery in investment spending after
1974. But can such factors explain the contin-
ued sluggishness of private investment nearly
three years after the recession trough? This
raises the question whether Japan's monetary
policy substantially delayed the recovery.
Chart 2
Growth Rates of Japanese Money and Real GNP























growth. Then, once the balance of payments
returned to equilibrium, the growth of the
money stock (and of real balances) accelerated
once again. Real output then recovered, grow-
ing for a time at above the long-run average,
and this reduced the excess capacity developed
during the previous slowdown.23
This pattern suggests a monetary interpre-
tation of Japan's recession and recovery; spe-
cificaiiy, it suggests that the 1973 reduction in
money growth caused the recession, while the
continuation of slow money growth prevented
real GNP from recovering fully thereafter. But
as indicated above, other important factors-
including the oil embargo and OPEC price
increases-also influenced output during this
period. In assessing the cost of Japan's anti-
inflation efforts, we should ask how much ofthe
reduced real growth in the 1974-78 period was
due to slower money growth, rather than to
these other factors.










Most economists agree that reducing infla-
tion entails significant costs in terms of lowered
real growth, but they disagree about their mag-
nitude and duration. Japan's pre-1973 experi-
ence certainly suggests that reduced money
growth helped slow inflation, but was also re-
sponsible, at least in part, for reduced real
growth thereafter. Prior to 1973, policy-in-
duced fluctuations in Japan's money growth
were followed fairly regularly by cyclical vari-
ations in real output growth; indeed, variations
in money growth were probably the most im-
portantinfluence onincome fluctuations during
this period. Typically, balance-of-payments
deficits developed during cyclical upturns lead-
ing the authorities to reduce money growth
below the secular average. The resulting
squeeze on corporate liquidity, manifested by
a deceleration in real-money balances (Chart
4) and rising real interest rates, generally led
within several quarters to a decline in real
Chart 3
Simulated Growth Rate of Japanese Real GNP
Change (%j
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Notes: The plots are based upon the following regression: L\q(t)=a+2:b(j)L\m(t-j)+ clL\q(t-1) + czL\q(t-2)
pol)
where q(t) is the logarithm of real GNP and m( ) is the log of M2. Data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted. In
estimating the b( ), a third degree polynomial with 'far' constraint was used, with lags from 0-7 quarters.
a: .025 (1.33) h(j): .16 (-.44) Adjusted R2: .16 Period: 1962.1-1972.4
j=0. •
cj : .11 (- .64) c,: .36 (2.31) ObservatIOns: 44
Both simulations depicted are dynamic after 1972. The black line gives the predicted effect on real income growth of
actual M2 growth over the period 1971-1978; the colored line simulates the impact of a return to the average rate of M2
growth prevailing before 1971, starting in 1975. For comparability with the previous charts, the quarterly growth rates














was at least partly responsible for the subse- output. In other words, both money growth
quent recession. Money growth began dece- and oil contributed to the unprecedented slow-
lerating, both in real and nominal terms, early down of 1974-75.
in 1973, while output growth slowed shortly The primary controversy about Japan's
afterward. By the third quarter of 1973--even monetary policy during this period centers
before the oil embargo--a fairly typical Japa- about its role during the recovery, instead of
nese "growth recession" was already evident. during the recession. This concerns the extent
In its early stages, this recession resembled the to which the traditional relation between
1965 recession, which was preceded by an al- money and real-output growth could have
most comparable slowing of money growth. been "exploited" by the authorities after 1974.
This similarity can be seen from the relation According to one "historical" view, the failure
between money and real-output growth over of money growth to return to its historical av-
the 1962-72 period, as summarized in the erage after the recession trough restrained the
notes to Chart 3.24 Dynamic simulation of this recovery. In this view, had money growth been
relation after 1972 (i.e., with simulated values maintained at a higher rate, real growth would
substituted for the lagged values of real GNP have been higher-although perhaps at some
growth) suggests that the reduction in money cost in additional inflation.25
growth would itself have resulted in a deceler- But according to an alternative interpreta-
ation of output growth quite comparable to tion, the post-1974 recovery was not primarily
the 1965 decline. The greater severity of the a manifestation of the earlier relation between
1974 recession is an indication of the substan- money and output, so that higher money
tial effect of the oil shock in depressing real growth primarily would have contributed to
Chart 4
Japanese Real Interest Rates and Real Money Growth
Change (%)
20
*Current quarter's call rate deflated by GNP deflator (average of preceding three quarters).
**Year-over-year growth in nominal M-2, deflated by GNP deflator.
35inflation without substantially increasing real
growth.26 In this view, various factors discour-
aging investment led to an autonomous decline
in the demand for investment goods corre-
sponding to given levels of current and ex-
pected future output, interest rates, and other
traditional investment determinants (i.e., the
investment schedule shifted downward). Thus,
investment during this period would have been
relatively unresponsive to traditional measures
of monetary ease. Because of the importance
of investment in Japan's total output, then, a
prolonged sluggish recovery was likely even if
money growth had been substantially greater.
If this account is correct, then the authori-
ties' 1975-78 reduction in money growth was
an appropriate policy response, because of the
likelihood that real output growth (and thus
real money-demand growth) would remain
substantially below the historical average for
a considerable period of time. If they had fol-
lowed the historical trend of money growth,
they would simply have kept inflation high; be-
cause inflation-created uncertainties can dis-
courage investment, such a policy could have
been counterproductive.
This interpretation is not as inconsistent
with Japan's past record as might at first ap-
pear. During previous cycles, investment and
output growth generally recovered only after
an adjustment period of several quarters fol-
lowing the easing of money growth; thus, in
the case at hand, this period was greatly pro-
longed by the severity of the recession and by
the uncertainties engendered by the previous
inflation and oil-price increase. Still, this inter-
pretation does not absolve pre-1974 monetary
policy of some responsibility for the sluggish
recovery; indeed, to the extent that the post-
1974 investment weakness was the result of the
severity of the downturn, prior monetary pol-
icy was partly responsible for that protracted
recovery.
It is difficult to determine which of these
explanations is most correct, considering that
their differences center around the hypotheti-
cal consequences ofdifferent monetary-growth
paths. Conceptually, the issue in dispute is one
of cause and effect: the first view asserts that
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slow money growth impeded the recovery,
whereas the second implies that slow money
growth was necessary to contain inflation be-
cause demand. growth was autonomously de-
pressed by other factors. Traditional measures
of monetary ease or tightness, such as interest
rates, provide ambiguous evidence, because
they are influenced both by policy and by the
actual level of aggregate demand. Neverthe-
less, the post-1974 recovery apparently dif-
fered in several important respects from the
pattern observed during previous business
cycles. In particular, the interactions between
money and output growth implied by the pre-
1973 historical record suggest that slow money
growth should not have depressed real growth
for as long as actually was the case. This evi-
dence, at the least, raises doubts about the
first interpretation.
The behavior of both interest rates and real
balances tended to refute the argument that
monetary policy restrained an otherwise ro-
bust recovery. At the least, their post-1975 be-
havior was not characteristic of previous pe-
riods of monetary restraint during cyclical
upswings. In Japan, the (interbank) call-
money rate has traditionally been free to vary
with market forces, while the central-bank dis-
count rate and the private-bank loan rate
(which is partially tied to the discount rate)
have usually been set below market-clearing
levels. Typically, as money growth slowed dur-
ing cyclical upswings, all interest rates in-
creased, although the call-money rate rose rel-
ative to the loan rate-and in addition, the
growth of real money balances decelerated
sharply. Moreover, these trends normally
tended to precede the slowing of real growth,
especially prior to the 1965 and 1973 slow-
downs. In addition, the call-money rate has
often risen in real terms, that is relative to the
recent inflation trend, during periods of mone-
tary restraint-with the exception of the sharp
inflation-related decline of 1973.
The 1974 recession and early recovery also
conformed, roughly, to the historical pattern,
although the same cannot be said of subse-
quent developments. The call-money rate,
both relative to the loan rate as well as in realterms, fell sharply during the downturn and
then recovered substantially for several quar-
ters following the early-1975 recession trough;
this pattern was fairly typical of previous
cycles, although more pronounced. But during
most of the 1976-78 period, both indicators
remained relatively low by historical stan-
dards; in fact, their levels were more charac-
teristic of previous downturns than of recov-
eries. Indeed, Japan's real interest rate was
actually lower during most of this period than
during 1971-72, when monetary policy was
"easy" by any normal standard.
Moreover, real-balance growth recovered
sharply from the 1975 recession trough-al-
though never again reaching the level attained
in previous recoveries-and then fell back in
1976. However, the 1976 decline coincided
with a fall-off in real GNP growth; indeed, a
sustained decline in nominal M-2 growth was
not really evident until the end of 1976. This
timing suggests that the decline in the growth
of real balances was the result of the deceler-
ation in growth ofreal money demand induced
by the fall in output growth. Such a pattern is
more consistent with the second interpretation
than the first. These patterns together tend to
refute the idea that strong investment demand
was "choked-off" by credit rationing in re-
sponse to a stringent monetary policy. How-
ever the evidence may also be consistent with
the first explanation, because the prospect of
lower money growth quite possibly discour-
aged investment demand during this period.
More persuasive, perhaps, is the implication
of the pre-1973 historical record, which sug-
gests that slow money growth should not have
depressed real growth after 1974 for nearly as
long as it actually did. The apparent reason is
the lack of a permanent 'trade-off' between
money and real output growth-in Japan as
well as elsewhere. That is, despite the influ-
ence of money-growth fluctuations on cyclical
variations in real output, permanent increases
or decreases in money growth tend to affect
only inflation, and not real growth, in the long
run. This conclusion is supported by the
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regression summarized in Chart 3 as well as
other statistical evidence reported elsewhere.27
Consequently, even permanent changes in
money growth cannot cause output growth to
deviate from the secular average indefinitely.
The question then is, how much and for how
long did the post-1973 reduction in money
growth depress Japan's real growth?
The evidence (Chart 3) suggests that re-
duced money growth had a substantial but rel-
atively short-lived impact on real output
growth. As the solid line indicates, even with
relatively slow money growth, real-output
growth should have returned to the secular
rate by mid-1976 if the historical relation had
continued to prevail. With this simulation also,
the fall-off in money growth beginning in late
1976 would have led to a sharp but fairly short
decline in output growth-but output growth
would have remained above the level actually
recorded over these years. Finally, raising
money growth beginning in 1975 back to its
historical rate would have speeded the recov-
ery somewhat, but not by a great deal (com-
pare the dotted and broken lines of the
chart).28
The evidence, although far from conclusive,
on the whole raises considerable doubts about
contentions that Japan's sluggish recovery was
due mainly to slow money growth. We should
not rule out the possibility that a sufficient
expansion in money growth would have raised
growth if the authorities had been prepared to
accept a renewal of double-digit inflation. But
the behavior ofreal balances and interest rates
during the recovery suggests that monetary
policy was not at all "tight" by historical stan-
dards. And the historical relation between out-
put and money growth suggests that the recov-
ery should have been substantially more robust
than it was-and that the effects of reduced
money growth should not have been nearly as
long-lasting as the first explanation suggests
they were. At the least, the evidence marks
the post-1974 recovery as peculiar in several
respects, and suggests a basis for the fear that
a significant increase in money growth would
mainly have raised the inflation rate. 29III. Summary and Conclusions
Over the last ten years, inflation and reces- Japan's experience also confirms that infla-
sion have been the dominant economic prob- tion reduction can be both protracted and
lems of the major industrial economies. Their painful. Inflation fell back to the historical av-
policy responses to these difficulties have often erage only after two years in which money
been quite similar, yet also different in impor- growth fell considerably below the pre-1973
tant respects. But the uniqueness ofeach coun- rate.The reduction in inflation was associated
try's experience makes it difficult for policy with very heavy costs in terms of lowered real
makers to draw clear lessons from their own growth, excess capacity, and unemployment.
nation's record alone-always there is the A very substantial portion of these costs can
question of "what if." Yet in principle, the almost certainly be attributed to anti-inflation
paths taken by other industrial countries can measures. Also, monetary pOlicy was probably
provide a clue to "what might have been." primarily responsible for the fact that the
The present article has surveyed Japan's ex- downturn was more severe in Japan than in
perience with inflation and recession over the other major industrial countries. And the
1973-78 period. We have attempted to deter- 1973-74 monetary restraint probably helped
mine the main causes of the rise and fall of retard the recovery by aggravating the reces-
Japaneseinflationandto gauge, in aroughfash- sion. It is much less clear, however, that mon-
ion, the costs it incurred in its successful effort etary policy thereafter could have raised out-
to reduce inflation. This effort has yielded some put growth substantially above that which
tentative conclusions, and it has also raised actually occurred. At the least, such a policy
some interesting questions. entailed substantial risks of rekindling infla-
Japan's experience confirms that the key to tion.
containing inflation is controlling money growth. Finally, there remain intriguing unanswered
Without the 1971-72 acceleration in money questions about Japan's experience. Why, for
growth, Japan's inflation in 1973 and 1974 example, were Japanese authorities able to re-
would have been much lower than it actually strain money growth over the 1976-78 period?
was. The relatively low inflation of the late Were they simply willing to bear the political
1970's was not the result of a fortuitous ex- and social costs which frequently force mone-
change-rate appreciation or government fiscal tary accommodation in the face of large defi-
"discipline," but rather of a consistent policy cits, or were these costs simply not important
of containing money growth. At the same to Japan? And while it can be argued that the
time, Japan's record shows that substantial in- post-1974 reduction in money growth was not
creases in the domestic price level sometimes primarily responsible for the sluggish recovery,
reflect more than domestic money growth. Ja- the question remains as to what factors pre-
pan probably imported a significant amount of cisely were responsible. As further research
inflation in 1973 and 1974. In addition, Japan's sheds light on these questions, policy makers
monetary authorities have demonstrated in other industrial nations are likely to draw
graphically that high budget deficits and for- additional lessons from Japan's experience.
eign-exchange market interventions need not
inevitably destroy monetary control.
38FOOTNOTES
1. Italy'saverage CPI inflation over 1973-1974was nearly
the same as Japan's; in other major industrial countries,
average inflation during this period was between one-half
and two-thirds of the Japanese rate. In all major industrial
countries except Germany and Japan, inflation rates have
remained well above the 1960's average since 1976. Ger-
many's performance is somewhat unusual, however, be-
Clluse average money growth since 1976 has actually
been above the average of 1964-72. One reason may be
an increase in international demand for the OM resulting
(say) from decreased demand for the dollar. If so, Ger-
many is perhaps the only major industrial nation to have
benefi.ted from a .true "virtuous circle" induced by currency
appreciation.
2. The growth of Japanese government nominal expen-
ditureaveraged about 12 percent during the 1960's, com-
pared to 15 percent over 1971-72 and 14 percent over
1971-74 (figures are taken from International Financial
StatistiCs). If the effects of government spending upon
the domestic price level for Japan are at all comparable
to those of other countries, these increases should have
had anegligibleimpact on Japaneseinflation. For example,
William Dewald and Maurice Marchon (1979) found (long-
run) elasticities of total nominal GNP with respect to gov-
ernment expenditures ranging from .05 for Germany and
.28 for France (see Table 3). These suggest that only
extraordinary accelerations in government spending have
a substantial impact upon domestic inflation; in contrast,
the elasticities of nominal income with respect to money
are generally much higher than those for government
spending.
3. Cagan (1980, p. 4) briefly reviews other results for the
U.S. He notes that regression studies generally suggest
a larger impact of import prices on domestic inflation than
do direct computations of the effect upon domestic costs
of external price hikes; as argued below, this is not sur-
prising since regression results tend to reflect the monetary
policy pursued in response. Cagan's own estimates sug-
gest that about 40 percent of the increase in the prices of
U.S. manufactures during this period (or about 16 per-
centage points) can be attributed to external price in-
creases. His estimate is somewhat higher than would be
suggested by Berner et al (1975), who calculated that
about 25 percent of the increase in the personal-con-
sumption deflator between mid-1973 and mid-1974 was
due to external price hikes. The difference can be traced
to the fact that Cagan also allowed for the impact of
increases in export prices, whereas Berner et al did not-
and to the fact that the latter estimates refer to consumer
prices, which are less heavily weighted with traded goods
than are wholesale prices of manufactures (see Cagan,
p.8).
4. Richard Cooper and Robert Lawrence (1975) discuss
various factors in the 1973-75 commodity price fluctua-
tions; see also "Aspects of World Inflation," OECO Eco-
nomic Outlook, JUly 1974, pp. 25-37. Supply factors, as
well as a surge in aggregate demand, seem to have influ-
enced the surge in basic commodity prices. Michael Keran
and Michael Riordan, "Stabilization Policy in a World Con-
text," Fall 1976 issue of this Review, attributed these
increases largely to a synchronized expansion of money
supplies in major industrial countries. This view is not
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necessarily inconsistent with the fact that relative prices
changed greatly in 1973-74, because certain basic com-
modity prices are often considerably more sensitive to
variations in world aggregate demand than are traded
goods in general. However, the OECO study also shows
that the actual increase in metals and food relative prices,
relative to the increased world (real) demand, was still
much sharper than during previous cycles (see p. 28).
5. Precisely why the money supply was allowed to ex-
pand so sharply in 1971-72 is not entirely clear. It has
been suggested that the authorities were worried about
the allegedly deflationary effects of the yen's revaluation.
Moreover, growth had already slowed in 1971, and tradi-
tionally money growth had been allowed to accelerate
during recoveries. But the magnitude and duration of the
money-growth expansion of 1971-72 were substantially
greater than the norms characteristic of the 1950's and
1960's.
6. The only comparable prior surge was that of 1962-63,
when M-2 increased at an annual rate of 22 percent,
compared to 25 percent in 1971-72. I have argued (see
Charles Pigott, "Expectations, Money, and the Forecasting
of Inflation" in the Spring 1980 issue of this Review) that
pricing decisions are likely to be based upon individuals'
forecasts of money, and that prices will tend to respond
more to money changes that are perceived as persistent
than to those viewed as transient. Prior to 1971, deceler-
ations of Japan's money growth normally followed accel-
erations in a fairly regular and comprehensible pattern.
Hence the 1971-72 money changes may at first have
been regarded as largely transient, delaying the price
response.
7. Bijan Aghevli and Carlos Rodriguez (1979) find that
about 18 percent of an increase in (commodity) import
prices is reflected in the GNP deflator. Since the unit value
of imports rose by nearly 100 percent over 1973-74, this
suggests a total increase in the deflator of 18 percentage
points as a result; this again is about two-thirds the actual
rise above historical rates in this index. However, as is
argued in Pigott, Rutledge, and Willett (1980), such
regression estimates tend to reflect the extent to which
external price increases are accommodated by money
expansion. This contention is supported by the results of
Dewald and Marchon (1979), whose findings suggest that
the impact of import prices on the domestic price level is
substantially lower for Canada than for Germany and the
U.K.-despite the similarity of all three countries' ratios of
imports to GNP. Indeed, most regression studies find that
domestic prices rise more in the long-run than in the
short-run in response to a rise in import prices. Because
increases in import prices tend, with a given money stock,
to lower real balances, the opposite pattern is more likely
in the absence of monetary accommodation.
8. This calculation-which is intended to provide an up-
per bound on the ultimate effect-is based upon a pro-
cedure very similar to that used by the World Bank in
computing "income attributable to changes in terms-of-
trade," and which is included in the Bank's definition of
"gross domestic income"; see, for example, their World
Tables 1976, p.7. This income element has been used to
explain fluctuations in consumption for LOC's, as well asfor other purposes. Its theoretical basis lies in the Slutsky-
Hicks notion of compensated demand. In particular, in a
two-good economy in which tastes are identical and hom-
othetic, this calculation approximates the amount of in-
come required to keep an individual's welfare (I.e. the
level of his indifference curve) constant when the price of
the good he sells (net) falls relative to that which he
"imports."
Almost surely, however, the estimate in the text is some-
what larger than the true final effect. Implicit in the cal-
culation is the assumption that the demand for money
depends upon permanent real wealth or rea! income,
which declines as the terms-of-trade fall. However, money
is to a large extent desired for transactions purposes, and
it is much less clear that a change in the terms-of-trade
will lower transactions demand, or indeed even change it
at alL In fact, Pierce and Enzler (1974), in assessing the
effects of the oil price shock on the U.S. economy, relate
money demand to a transactions index equal to GNP plus
imports; the increase in the price of imported oil actually
raises the transactions demand for money under this for-
mulation, and hence ultimately leads to a fall in the do-
mestic price level.
9. It should be emphasized that this calculation assumes
that money, nominal income, and the price level vary
roughly proportionately in the long-run. Although money
and nominal income grew at virtually the same rate over
1962-70, a mild fall in velocity at a roughly 1-percent
annual rate was observed for the 1960's as a whole.
Allowing for such a trend would not substantially affect the
estimate of the inflation due to the 1973-74 external price
increase, provided the trend were the same under either
money path.
In regression relations between Japanese inflation and
money growth for the pre-1971 period, the adjusted R-
square is generally found to be quite low, and the long-
run impact of money on the price level is well below unity.
I have argued-see Pigott (1980)-thatthis may reflect the
tendency of money-growth accelerations to be offset by
subsequent decelerations, so that money changes above
or below the secular average may have been viewed as
transient. It might then be expected that prices would not
respond fully to actual money changes. This may also
explain why the sharp acceleration in money growth over
1962-63 did not lead to nearly as sharp an increase in
inflation. Indeed, average M-2 growth overthese years was
22 percent, compared to 25 percent in 1971-72. However,
inflation did not substantially change over 1964-65, in
sharp contrast to the surge in the second episode. Keran
(1970) points out that during the earlier period, the gov-
ernment had a well-established policy of tightening mon-
etary policy soon after balance-of-payments deficits de-
veloped. It is quite possible, then, that even the money
expansion of 1962-63 was expected to be reversed later,
so that prices did not respond. By 1973, however, this
pattern had disappeared, because Japanese international
reserves had been substantially augmented, while the
fixed exchange-rate system had broken down. Individuals
may then have come to believe that the 1971-72 money
expansion would not be subsequently offset, or at least
not as much as in the past; hence prices may have re-
sponded more than in the previous period.
10. This indeed is why the increases were greater for the
CPI and WPI than for the deflator. In addition, the WPI,
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because it includes goods at different stages of process-
ing, tends to "double-count" price increases of raw ma-
terials. The distortion in the WPI arising from this can be
quite substantial, as William Nordhaus and John Shoven
have shown ("Inflation 1973: The Year of Infamy," Chal-
lenge, May/June 1974, pp. 14-22).
11. Consider another "back-of-the-envelope" calculation.
Suppose that half of total U.S. inflation recorded over
1973-74 was attributable to external price increases; this
is at the upper bound of estimates in the literature, and
implies that substantially more than half the additional
increase in the U.S. CPI was due to commodity-price
hikes. In any case, this implies that the U.S. CPI was
raised by 9.5 percentage points as a result. Since the ratio
of imports (and exports) to GNP is about 40 percent higher
for Japan than for the U.S., it is reasonable to suppose
that Japan imported somewhat more inflation. Suppose
that commodity price hikes increased the Japanese CPI
by 15 percentage points (nearly 60 percent more than for
the U.S.). Since the actual increase in Japan's CPI-45
percent-was more than 30 percentage points greater
than during a "typical" two-year interval during the 1960's,
this suggests that at most half of Japan's CPI acceleration
could have been due to external price increases. The
fraction for the deflator, v'Yhich is less heavily 'y'veighted vvith
imported goods, was almost surely smaller; indeed, the
deflator rose by nearly 8 percentage points less than the
CPI during this period.
12. German CPI inflation averaged only 6.75 percent over
1973-74, despite money growth somewhat above the his-
torical average in 1971-72. In fact, in all other major
industrial countries except Italy, average annual CPI infla-
tion in 1973-74 was below 12 percent (usually below 10
percent)-Iess than two-thirds the rate suffered by Japan.
Several of these countries are substantially more depen-
dent on trade than Japan is.
13. One possible reason why the CPI rate remained
above the historical average was a delay in price in-
creases in government-regulated sectors. The WPI move-
ments were also probably somewhat distorted by the
sharp fall in basic commodity prices during late 1974 and
1975. However, neither factor can account satisfactorily
for the SUbstantially higher rate of increase of the CPI
compared to the GNP deflator during this period.
14. The yen's appreciation in real terms, in fact, exceeded
the fall in the real value of the U.S. dollar after the De-
cember 1970 devaluation. Between 1970 and 1972, in
fact, the dollar value of U.S. wholesale prices fell relative
to those of her trading partners by about 12 percent; as
noted in the text, the dollar value of Japan's wholesale
prices rose relative to abroad by substantially more than
12 percent. However in 1970, the U.S. was clearly in a
chronically imbalanced position in its current account;
moreover, by 1973, the volume of both our exports and
imports had responded quite sharply to the previous de-
valuation. In addition, most estimates of the price elastic-
ities of demand for traded goods suggest that even a
secular surplus of the size of Japan's would have required
a far smaller change in relative prices than actually oc-
curred over 1977-78. See Keran (1979) for further argu-
ments that the Japanese surplus was largely a business-
cycle imbalance. He also shows that the expansion of the
surplus in 1978 was due entirely to price changes.15. See Keran (1979), pp. 228-238 and especially Figure
2.
16. This performance is more impressive than might at
first appear. Both Germany and Switzerland substantially
overshot money-growth targets in 1978, in large part be-
cause of heavy dollar purchases.
17. The most pessimistic views are based upon a fixed
relation between excess capacity and changes in inflation.
These imply that reducing inflation requires maintaining
unemployment well above its natural rate for many years.
See, for example, Nigel Duck, Michael Parkin, David
Rose, and George Zis, "The Determination of the Rate of
Change of Wages and Prices in The Fixed Exchange Rate
World Economy, 1956-1971," in Michael Parkin and
George Zis (eds.), Inflation in The World Economy, 1977,
especially pp. 134-136.
18. This conclusion is supported by the study by James
Pierce and Jared Enzler (1974) of the effects of the oil-
price increase on the U.S. economy. They found that real
output was substantially depressed and unemployment
raised as a result (see pp. 36-41). The effect on Japan
was almost certainly larger, because of its much greater
dependence on oil imports.
19. According to the potentia!·output series computed by
Artus (1978), Japan's actual output was below potential
by nearly 25 percent at the recession trough in 1975. The
output gap for other major industrial countries was only
about half as large. His figures also suggest that the gap
remained very wide in all major industrial countries except
the U.S. through 1978. In Japan, for example, the gap
was almost certainly above 15 percent by the end of 1978.
These statements are based upon extensions of his series
using industrial-production data from International Finan-
cial Statistics (although the series are not strictly com-
parable). Artus' figures also show a slowing of potential-
output growth to about 5 percent over 1976-78, compared
to nearly 12 percent prior to 1973.
20. This statement is based, in part, on the extraordinary
fall-off in private investment expenditures over 1974-77.
Real private non-residential investment grew nearly 50
percent faster than real output over 1965-73, while it grew
more slowly than output during 1974-77. Because this
sector accounts for nearly one-fifth of total GNP, its slow-
ing was bound to substantially retard the recovery. The
depressed state of investment and reasons for it are ex-
tensively discussed in the Economic Survey of Japan
for fiscal 1975/76 and 1976/77. See especially pages 37-
46 of the 1975/76 issue and pp. 84-98 of 1976/77. These
present an interesting contrast indicative of the uncertain-
ties about the course of the economy: the earlier issue
reflects the beginnings of an investment recovery in 1976;
the subsequent issue focuses on why investment remains
sluggish, reflecting the stalling of the recovery. These is-
sues also indicate considerable divergence in conditions
in various industries and among various-sized firms- a
divergence that may have led to additional uncertainty
about relative prices and demands. Other sectors also
influenced the recovery as well, of course. Until 1978, real
export growth exceeded that of imports, so the external
sector contributed to Japan's growth. In 1978 this pattern
was reversed, and indeed real GNP growth that year
would have been well above 6 percent had real export
and import growth been equal. Inventory investment fell
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sharply in 1975, after remaining high in 1974-a pattern
fairly typical of an unexpectedly severe downturn. Finally,
while real private consumption certainly slowed compared
to the 1960's, its behavior suggests a fairly passive ad-
justment to the slower growth of total output. Private and
total savings rates actually fell after 1974, although this
again is not surprising in view of the sharp downturn.
21. See Economic Survey of Japan, fiscal 1976/77, pp.
8D-98.
22. There has, in fact, been considerable controversy
about the future level of Japan's long-run secular growth
rate. Projections of a 6-percent growth rate are to a large
extent based upon the relatively sluggish investment of
1976-1978; in view of the continued very high savings
rate, this seems unduly pessimistic. There is a consensus
that Japan's future growth will be slower than in the pre-
1973 period, because of a slowing of productivity in-
creases. How much lower depends crucially upon the
contribution to growth of capital and labor vis-a-vis that of
technical progress. See M. Nishimizu and Charles Hulten,
"The Sources of Japanese Economic Growth; 1955-
1971," Research Memo #200 (June 1976) of the Econo-
metric Research Program of Princeton University. On bal-
ance, it seems likely that Japan's secular growth rate is
above 6 percent. Thus growth during 1975-78 has prob-
ably been below the secular average-and certainly has
not been substantially above it as occurred during pre-
vious recoveries.
23. See Keran (1970) and Pigott (1978) for further dis-
cussion of this policy and its effects.
24. The procedure used here departs from my previous
analysis of the relation between Japanese money and
output-see Pigott (1978)-in that money growth is not
decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated compo-
nents in the regression. In the previous study, Iconsidered
mainly the effect of money growth on Japan's industrial
production. The findings, in the sense that the long-run
impact of an increase in money on Japan's industrial pro-
duction was virtually zero, are consistent with those re-
ported here. The relation summarized in Chart 3 is in fact,
more "traditionaL" It can be viewed as a reduced form of
a system in which money influences nominal income and
prices, as well as real income. Although the relation used
here allows only current and past money (up to seven
quarters) to affect output growth directly, the effective lag
from money growth to output is potentially much longer
because of the inclusion of lagged output growth as re-
gressors. These latter terms can, if large, allow a change
in money growth to affect output for a considerably longer
time than the lag on money alone would suggest. In fact,
however, the coefficients of the lagged dependent vari-
ables were relatively small, and this largely accounts for
the fact that output growth seems to "rebound" quickly
even when money growth is substantially permanently
reduced. This finding is also fairly similar to that reported
in the earlier study. I experimented with alternative lag
lengths for money, but found that allOWing for a twelve-
quarter lag length (compared to the eight for the regres-
sion reported) substantially reduced the adjusted R-
square.
25. The U.S. experience appears to confirm this: U.S.
inflation accelerated along with money growth after 1976,
while U.S. output growth returned to the secular rate.However, as is discussed later, this pattern is not nearly
as clear when the industrial countries as a whole are
examined.
26. This view is certainly consistent with the actions of
the Japanese authorities, and it seems to have been held
by some. As will become clearer below, it was obvious by
1976 that the recovery was already rather different from
previous episodes. The Economic Survey of Japan is-
sues at the time placed considerable emphasis on struc-
tural shifts needed in response to higher oil prices and
other factors-which further suggests that this was not an
ordinary recovery, and hence may not have been as malle-
able (via monetary expansion) as those in the past.
27. See Pigott (1978). The results there also imply that
there is no permanent effect of money growth on real-
output growth.
28. A static regression, using the actual values of real
GNP growth during 1973-74 (at least) might have been
more appropriate here, although space prevents its pre-
sentation. However, the pattern is essentially the same,
except that income growth falls lower during 1974 than
under the dynamic simulation. The difference between the
simulations with actual money growth versus the average
rate of the 1960's is virtually the same in either case.
29. Again, the record of other industrial countries is
suggestive, although far from conclusive. Output gaps in
all major European countries apparently remained sub-
stantial through 1978 (based upon my extension of Artus'
actual output figures and his estimates of potential output).
None of these countries, however, succeeded in reducing
money growth (or, except in the case of Germany, infla-
tion) back to the pre-1973 average. In France, for exam-
ple, inflation remained nearly twice as high in 1975-78 as
in 1964-72, while her output gap averaged over 10 per-
cent. This evidence may be suspect, however, because
real wages apparently rose in excess of productivity after
1973 in many European countries, which may have helped
to retard the recovery and keep unemployment high.
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